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ABSTRACT. In 1855 a parliamentary committee concluded that Robert McClure deserved to be rewarded as the discoverer 
of a Northwest Passage. Since then, various writers have put forward rival claims on behalf of Sir John Franklin, John Rae, 
and Roald Amundsen. This article examines the process of 19th-century European exploration in the Arctic Archipelago, 
the definition of discovering a passage that prevailed at the time, and the arguments for and against the various contenders. It 
concludes that while no one explorer was “the” discoverer, McClure’s achievement deserves reconsideration. 
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RÉSUMÉ. En 1855, un comité parlementaire a conclu que Robert McClure méritait de recevoir le titre de découvreur d’un 
passage du Nord-Ouest. Depuis lors, diverses personnes ont avancé des prétentions rivales à l’endroit de Sir John Franklin, 
de John Rae et de Roald Amundsen. Cet article se penche sur l’exploration européenne de l’archipel Arctique au XIXe siècle, 
sur la définition de la découverte d’un passage en vigueur à l’époque, de même que sur les arguments pour et contre les divers 
prétendants au titre. Nous concluons en affirmant que même si aucun des explorateurs n’a été « le » découvreur, les réalisations 
de Robert McClure méritent d’être considérées de nouveau. 
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INTRODUCTION
In 1855 a parliamentary committee declared that Captain 
Robert McClure had discovered the—or rather a—
Northwest Passage. On the committee’s recommendation, 
McClure and his men were awarded £10 000 for their 
achievement. McClure himself received a knighthood. 
But even before these awards were made, the decision was 
controversial, and McClure is now seldom if ever credited 
as the discoverer. Over the years Sir John Franklin, John 
Rae, and Roald Amundsen have all had their champions, 
and no consensus has yet emerged.
There are several Northwest Passages, and the 
19th-century definition of discovering a passage involved 
both geography and navigation (Fig. 1). That the process 
of discovery extended over many decades and was 
carried out by several different forms of travel adds 
further complications. This article outlines the stages of 
exploration and the claims put forward by explorers (or 
by their supporters). It concludes that it is impossible to 
single out one individual as the passage’s true discoverer, 
but McClure’s claim deserves more attention than it has 
received since the 1850s.
THE SEARCH FOR THE PASSAGE BY SHIP
AND BOAT, 1818 – 39
The search for the passage was renewed in 1818, at the 
urging of Admiralty official John Barrow. Conveniently, 
the government provided a definition of discovery when 
it passed an act that both confirmed and modified a long-
standing award of £20 000, first offered in 1745. Under the 
new act, anyone who could “find out and sail through” a 
northern channel all the way from Atlantic to Pacific 
would still receive £20 000, but “proportionate rewards” 
were introduced for those who first “accomplished certain 
portions” of the passage (United Kingdom, Parliament, 
1818). The details were worked out by the Board of 
Longitude and authorized by an order-in-council (United 
Kingdom, Privy Council, 1819). Increments of £5000 
were offered for passing meridians 110 ,˚ 130 ,˚ and 150˚ W. 
Once these three rewards were collected, the explorer who 
completed the last stage would receive only the remaining 
£5000 (United Kingdom, Parliament, 1821). 
The key criteria, then, were geographically discovering 
all or part of a passage and demonstrating that it was 
navigable for ships by actually sailing through it. The 
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introduction of the intermediate awards raised the 
possibility that the explorer who first reached the Pacific 
through the Arctic would share the financial prize equally 
with three others. In terms of money, the last stage was 
worth no more than the first. Indeed, if one explorer 
reached the first three milestones and another completed 
the passage, the first captain’s monetary reward would be 
much greater than his successor’s. Whether the fame would 
be shared in the same way was naturally not considered in 
the official documents, although the explorers themselves 
must have wondered.
The first effort was led in 1818 by John Ross, who turned 
back at the entrance to Lancaster Sound, believing it was a 
dead end. During his 1819 – 20 voyage in Hecla and Griper, 
Edward Parry sailed through Lancaster Sound and its 
continuation, Barrow Strait, as far as Melville Island. He 
was stopped just off the Dundas Peninsula by exceptionally 
heavy pack ice. This ice, he recorded (1821:250), “was as 
solid and compact, to all appearance, as so much land.” 
Parry therefore returned to England, where he claimed the 
first of the £5000 awards. The scheme was then altered and 
enriched, with £5000 for passing 130˚ W, £5000 for passing 
150˚ W, and £10 000 for reaching the Pacific (United 
Kingdom, Privy Council, 1821). 
Parry suspected that he had nearly accomplished the 
passage, but he also knew that such ice as he had seen near 
Melville Island might be a permanent barrier. Parry had in 
fact almost reached the Beaufort Sea, which was the source 
of the heavy ice. But, he reasoned, there must be another 
passage in a lower latitude, where ice conditions would 
be better. Moreover, Parry had found that the best way to 
navigate through Arctic waters was near a coastline, in 
water deep enough for ships but shallow enough that heavy 
ice would be grounded well offshore, leaving a lane of 
comparatively open water. Along the coast of the continent, 
explorers could be “sure that the land will not fail us” 
(Parry, 1821:298). 
Parry made his next effort through Hudson Strait and 
Fury and Hecla Strait, but was again blocked by ice. On his 
third voyage, he tried Prince Regent Inlet, but lost one of his 
ships and was forced to return. Many explorers hoped that 
the land on the west side of this inlet (later called Boothia) 
was an island, and that it would be possible to follow the 
coastline from the bottom of the Gulf of Boothia westward 
to the Bering Strait. In 1829 – 33 John Ross made another 
attempt through Prince Regent Inlet, but he did not get far 
enough south to clear this question up. His nephew, James 
Clark Ross, traveled to the western coast of Boothia and 
reached King William “Land” (actually an island), which 
he believed was connected with Boothia.
In 1819 Barrow had decided to supplement Parry’s 
explorations from the east with modest but potentially useful 
efforts in the western Arctic. John Franklin had accordingly 
carried out two overland expeditions that reached the Arctic 
Ocean via the Coppermine River in 1819 – 22 and the 
Mackenzie River in 1825 – 27, then surveyed the continental 
coast in boats. On his first expedition, Franklin traveled 
as far east as the Kent Peninsula; on the second, Franklin 
himself went west, past the Alaska border, while another 
party led by John Richardson sailed east from the mouth 
of the Mackenzie to the mouth of the Coppermine. During 
this boat voyage, Richardson passed the next intermediate 
milestone, longitude 130˚ W. But, as he regretfully observed 
(in Franklin, 1828:258), because “it was not contemplated, 
in framing the Order, that the discovery should be made 
from west to east, and in vessels so small,” he “could not 
lay claim to the pecuniary reward.” Franklin correctly 
believed that the waters charted during his expeditions 
were navigable by ships, yet navigation had taken place 
only in boats. In 1828 the remaining awards were canceled, 
probably as a result of this development. 
After 1828, naval exploration in the Arctic ceased for 
several years. Ross’s expedition to Prince Regent Inlet was 
privately sponsored, as was George Back’s journey down 
the Great Fish (Back) River in 1833 – 35, which was initially 
intended to be a search for the long-absent Ross. Back 
received word of Ross’s safe return to England during the 
early part of his journey, and therefore he was instructed by 
the committee in charge of the expedition to first survey the 
Arctic coast westward as far as Franklin’s Point Turnagain 
on the Kent Peninsula, then attempt to connect that coast 
with the Rosses’ discoveries (Back, 1836:19). Ice conditions 
prevented even the first attempt, but looking east from the 
mouth of Chantrey Inlet, Back (1836:425) saw what he 
described as “strong inferences in favour of the existence of 
a southern channel to Regent’s Inlet.” 
Back had at least established that the coast at the mouth 
of the Back River was in roughly the same latitude as Point 
Turnagain. The interest aroused by this result was great 
enough to win approval for a new Admiralty expedition, 
intended to chart the coast between Prince Regent Inlet and 
Point Turnagain. In 1836 Back was instructed to sail to the 
northwest corner of Hudson Bay, then travel overland from 
there to the Gulf of Boothia (Back, 1838:1, 6 – 15). However, 
the ice was exceptionally bad in that year. Back’s ship, 
Terror, was severely damaged and the overland attempt 
never took place.
The unknown coast from Point Turnagain to just beyond 
Chantrey Inlet was finally charted by two Hudson’s Bay 
Company (HBC) employees, Peter Warren Dease and 
Thomas Simpson, during boat expeditions in 1838 and 
1839. After reaching the area previously visited by Back 
and proceeding a little farther east, they too thought they 
saw a way into the Gulf of Boothia ahead of them. Dease 
and Simpson landed on the southwest coast of King 
William Island, believing it was part of Boothia, and built 
a large cairn at Cape Herschel (Simpson, 1843:371 – 380). 
Simpson intended to return the next year and continue into 
the Gulf of Boothia (Simpson, 1845:329, 340 – 344), but in 
the interim, he died. 
Even though Boothia is actually a peninsula, not an 
island, Dease and Simpson had come very close to joining 
their discoveries with those made by Parry’s second and 
third expeditions and by the Rosses. Contrary to the 
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FIG. 1. Arctic Archipelago: Northwest Passage area. (Map by Eric Leinberger.)
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expectations held in 1818, after Parry’s first voyage efforts 
from the east in ships had made only modest advances. 
In contrast, boat exploration from the west had been 
outstandingly successful. Given this situation, it might 
well have been asked whether discovering the Northwest 
Passage still meant sailing all the way through it in a ship. 
The framers of the 1818 award scheme had envisioned an 
east-to-west process of discovery in which the last explorer 
would voyage into the final remaining unknown area, then 
emerge through the Bering Strait. But now both the eastern 
and the western ends had been charted, and an unknown 
“last link”—to quote a famous phrase—lay somewhere 
between them. It was possible that the next explorer might 
join the known area in the east with the known area in the 
west, establishing the fact that a water connection between 
Atlantic and Pacific did exist north of the continent. This 
would be a key geographical discovery. However, if the 
geographical puzzle was solved without navigation in 
ships, even if soundings or other observations indicated 
navigability, then according to the logic employed in 1818 
the Northwest Passage would be known, yet not truly 
discovered. But must the 1818 criteria still be applied?
Dease and Simpson themselves believed they had 
discovered the passage, and Simpson’s memorial tablet 
praised him for this feat (Simpson, 1845:328, 397 – 402; 
Barr, 2000:114 – 115). If a strait between Boothia and the 
mainland had in fact proved to be the last link, the claim 
might have received attention in later years, but since there 
is no such channel, it was forgotten. 
A NEW SHIP EXPEDITION, 1836 – 48
During the 1830s, Barrow envisioned a new ship 
expedition that would begin by following Parry’s original 
route through Lancaster Sound and Barrow Strait, then 
turn southwest toward the Bering Strait. On his voyages to 
and from Melville Island in 1819 – 20, Parry had found land 
both north and south of the waters now collectively known 
as Parry Channel. On the northern side, he saw and named 
North Devon (Devon Island) and Cornwallis, Bathurst, and 
Byam Martin Islands, plus many smaller islands (Fig. 1). 
He observed that the passage to the north between North 
Devon and Cornwallis Island, which he named Wellington 
Channel, appeared to be free of ice. On the south side, 
the land west of Prince Regent Inlet was glimpsed only 
intermittently. Parry gave this land the general name of 
North Somerset. Two prominent capes were named Bunny 
and Walker. Parry thought there was likely a southward-
leading channel west of Cape Bunny. West of Cape Walker 
the southern land disappeared altogether; there, although 
Parry did not realize it, Parry Channel widens out into 
Viscount Melville Sound. Finally, southwest of Melville 
Island, Parry saw a coast to which he gave the name Banks 
Land (Parry, 1821:52 – 74, 238, 265).
Barrow was convinced that west and south of Cape 
Walker there was only open sea except for Banks Land, 
Wollaston Land, and Victoria Land, all of which he 
assumed were comparatively small. The two latter lands 
had been sighted by Richardson and Simpson, respectively, 
and were in fact the southwestern and southeastern parts of 
Victoria Island, which occupies most of the area thought by 
Barrow to be water. Barrow scoffed at Parry’s belief that 
safe navigation was possible only along a coastline; instead, 
he proposed that a route be sought directly from Cape 
Walker to the Bering Strait (Barrow et al., 1836:36 – 37). 
In 1836, the Royal Geographical Society (RGS) asked 
Franklin, Richardson, and John Ross to comment on 
Barrow’s proposal. Franklin recommended that the survey 
of the continental coast from the Gulf of Boothia to Point 
Turnagain be completed first. The same expedition could 
explore from Boothia to Cape Walker “and thereby gain 
well-grounded information” to guide the ships that Franklin 
hoped would later be sent in search of the passage (Barrow 
et al., 1836:45). Richardson agreed with this plan, and he 
also thought there should be further surveys in the western 
Arctic, including investigation of Wollaston Land. There 
was, he observed (Barrow et al., 1836:40), no need for 
open sea in the unknown space to make the Northwest 
Passage practicable; rather, the discovery of a strait leading 
southwest from Cape Walker could also mean success. 
Richardson thought it best to determine the route before 
sending out two ships—preferably with steam power, 
so they could push through ice in a narrow channel—to 
navigate it.
Finally, John Ross criticized Barrow but endorsed 
Franklin’s and Richardson’s plans. He opined that there 
was continuous land west of Cape Walker. His reason for 
this belief was that the Melville Island ice drifted east 
through Barrow Strait. Since the prevailing winds were 
from the northwest, he thought it would go south instead 
unless blocked by land. According to Ross (Barrow et 
al., 1836:50), success would most likely be achieved “by 
keeping close to the shore, from Cape Walker, westward.” 
But unknown to Ross, although much ice drifted through 
Barrow Strait, even more was carried southeast through 
M’Clintock Channel.
The RGS recommended Franklin’s proposal to the 
government, and the result was Back’s abortive 1836 – 37 
attempt (see above). However, the instructions did not 
include exploration towards Cape Walker. After Back’s 
failure, Barrow was eager to go ahead without further 
reconnaissance. Action in the north was delayed by 
James Ross’s voyage to the Antarctic in HMS Erebus 
and HMS Terror. In December 1844, Barrow finally put 
forward a new Arctic proposal (in Cyriax, 1939:18 – 20). 
The expedition would use Ross’s ships, which had been 
strengthened for their Antarctic venture. Confident that the 
Erebus and Terror could plunge into the unknown without 
significant danger, Barrow did not modify his 1836 plan. 
Although Franklin agreed with Barrow that he should 
turn southwest after passing Cape Walker, he had very 
different—and far more accurate—expectations about 
what he would find there. As he explained in several letters 
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written during the early part of his voyage (1845a, b, c), 
because Parry had seen muskoxen on Melville Island, 
Franklin was convinced there must be extensive land 
between the continent and Parry’s discoveries, providing 
“a track ... not greatly broken by wide channels of water” 
(Franklin, 1845b). 
There was, Franklin hoped, a strait between Banks Land 
and Wollaston Land that would lead him to the southwest. 
In other words, his goal was to find what is now called 
Prince of Wales Strait, which would indeed have been an 
ideal route. Anticipating the need to push through ice in a 
strait, he insisted that the ships be equipped with auxiliary 
steam engines (Cyriax, 1939:24 – 25). Franklin did not say 
so, but he probably accepted John Ross’s theory that land 
continued far west of Cape Walker. If Ross was right, then 
Franklin could sail between the shore and the ice until he 
reached the strait between this new land and Banks Land. 
But Ross was wrong, and the wide opening of M’Clintock 
Channel lay across Franklin’s planned route. 
Franklin’s letter to Richardson (1845a) went into more 
detail than the others because Richardson believed the route 
through Prince Regent Inlet held great promise. Franklin, 
however, thought the Gulf of Boothia was probably too 
dangerous for ships. That area, he told Richardson, should 
be surveyed in boats. In addition, Franklin was not sure 
that any of the waters explored by Dease and Simpson 
(Dease Strait, Queen Maud Gulf, Simpson Strait, and 
the southern end of Rasmussen Basin) were navigable by 
ships. However, “once to the west of Point Turnagain our 
ships might with safety go.” Franklin accordingly showed 
no interest in Parry’s theory about a channel leading south 
from Cape Bunny, and in any case he agreed with James 
Ross, who believed the continental coast likely extended all 
the way from Boothia to Cape Walker (1845b, c).
Franklin’s orders—which he no doubt helped to draft—
instructed him not to examine any openings to either the 
north or the south until he reached Cape Walker. “From 
that point,” the orders (United Kingdom, Admiralty, 
1848) continued, “we desire that every effort be used to 
endeavour to penetrate to the southward and westward in 
a course as direct towards Bhering’s Strait as the position 
and extent of the ice, or the existence of land, at present 
unknown, may admit.” If Franklin could not progress in 
this direction, he was authorized to try Wellington Channel 
and look for a route north of Melville Island. Then he 
could winter at a spot of his choosing and decide his own 
course in the second season. As Franklin explained to his 
correspondents (see especially 1845b), with three years’ 
supplies he would have time to try several routes. “I shall of 
course,” he assured Richardson (1845a), “despatch parties 
in boats and by land to examine into and find out passages 
in places where it may be difficult & only productive of 
delay in taking the ships.”
In the first year Franklin was unable to follow his 
preferred route, and he therefore sailed up Wellington 
Channel. After circumnavigating Cornwallis Island, he 
wintered at Beechey Island, near the southwestern corner 
of Devon Island. In 1846 he arrived off the north coast 
of King William Island by an unknown route. The ships 
wintered there in the ice. On 11 June 1847 Franklin died; 
on 22 April 1848 the men abandoned the ships, which 
had drifted slightly southwest into Victoria Strait. Led by 
Francis Crozier, they trekked down the west coast of King 
William Island toward Chantrey Inlet, apparently hoping to 
travel up the Back River to safety. On the way, they passed 
Dease and Simpson’s cairn at Cape Herschel. The rest is 
conjecture.
Parry’s hunch about a channel leading south from Cape 
Bunny was correct. The northern part of this channel is 
now called Peel Sound, while the southern part has been 
named Franklin Strait. During the Franklin search, Peel 
Sound was visited in 1849, 1851, 1852, 1858, and 1859; in 
each of these years it was solidly blocked with ice. West 
of Cape Walker, M’Clintock Channel leads south and 
then southeast, providing another possible route to King 
William Island. One of its shores was examined in 1851 and 
1859. Since the ice conditions seen there were even worse 
than in Peel Sound, it has generally been assumed that 
Franklin must have found Peel Sound open for once. Then, 
confronted with the stream of ice pouring down M’Clintock 
Channel and into Victoria Strait, he supposedly chose to 
push his ships into this pack (Neatby, 1958:181; Savours, 
1999:293; Williams, 2009:345, 355). Victoria Strait 
leads south to Queen Maud Gulf—east of the area where 
Franklin believed his ships could “with safety go.” Such a 
move, then, would have been at odds with the intentions he 
had outlined to Richardson. 
When Franklin’s men passed Cape Herschel, discoveries 
from the east had finally overlapped with those from the 
west. Geographically, Victoria Strait was the last link 
in a chain of waters joining the Atlantic and the Pacific. 
However, even if Victoria Strait had been ice-free, Franklin 
himself would not have regarded reaching Cape Herschel as 
equivalent to discovering the Northwest Passage, because 
he was not sure the waters between Cape Herschel and 
Point Turnagain were navigable. Nevertheless, when his 
expedition’s story became known, Franklin was almost 
universally hailed as the discoverer. In terms of geography 
alone, the accolade was merited—although, since it was 
not clear whether Franklin was still alive when the link was 
confirmed, the title should have been shared with Crozier. 
However, Franklin and Crozier themselves would have 
been the first to acknowledge that their passage might not 
be navigable.
Whether the Erebus and Terror reached Victoria Strait 
by way of Peel Sound and Franklin Strait or by way of 
M’Clintock Channel might seem to be a minor question, 
but in fact it was central to the perception of Franklin as 
the hero of the Northwest Passage. This matter is discussed 
in detail below; here it is sufficient to observe that ice 
conditions on both routes were likely difficult in 1846. 
If both were feasible, Franklin would have preferred 
M’Clintock Channel because it was farther west and 
might have led to the vicinity of Point Turnagain. But if 
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there was clearly no possibility of progress by this route, 
he could indeed have tried Peel Sound, hoping it would 
turn westward. Or he might have realized the dangers 
of M’Clintock Channel too late—a forgotten theory that 
deserves reconsideration. 
THE SEARCH FOR FRANKLIN
AND FOR THE PASSAGE, 1848 – 54
When a search for Franklin was discussed in 1847, 
Richardson’s first thought was that the ships had gone 
beyond Cape Walker, then been crushed by ice. He 
recommended (1848) that a boat expedition should check 
Wollaston and Victoria Lands for survivors. Richardson’s 
proposal was approved, and he was joined by John Rae 
of the HBC, who had made an important coastal survey 
in 1846 – 47. Richardson and Rae searched the western 
continental coast, but were unable to cross to Wollaston 
Land in either 1848 or 1849 because of unusually heavy ice 
in Dolphin and Union Strait.
James Ross, meanwhile, proposed (1848) a two-ship 
eastern search. One ship would winter on Melville Island 
and then explore the coasts of Banks Land by sledge, 
possibly joining with Richardson’s party; the other would 
try Wellington Channel, then winter on North Somerset and 
examine the nearby coasts. This plan was also approved, 
but to his astonishment, in 1848 Ross was unable to reach 
Melville Island, or even to pass from Lancaster Sound into 
Barrow Strait. Both his ships wintered at the entrance to 
Prince Regent Inlet.
From there, Ross sledged partway down the east coast 
of Peel Sound in 1849. His observations reduced Parry’s 
North Somerset to what is now called Somerset Island. 
However, Ross did not realize it was an island, supposing 
instead that it was the northern end of Boothia. Nor did he 
realize that Peel Sound was a strait, because he could see 
only isolated points of land to the west. These appeared like 
scattered small islands, when in fact they were headlands 
on Prince of Wales Island. One of Ross’s officers, Leopold 
McClintock, later recounted (1857a:195) that it seemed any 
attempt to take a ship into this area “would not only fail, but 
lead to almost inevitable risk of destruction” because of the 
exceptionally heavy ice. 
The next eastern attempt was made by Horatio Austin 
with a squadron of ships in 1850 – 51. Like Ross, Austin 
could not reach Melville Island. He took up winter 
quarters at Griffith Island, south of Cornwallis Island. A 
sledge party under William Browne examined the west 
side of Peel Sound, which was given the name Peel Strait. 
Browne (1851:75) considered that “this channel is rarely, 
if ever, sufficiently open for the purposes of navigation.” 
At the same time, on the other side of Prince of Wales 
Island, Sherard Osborn covered part of the eastern shore of 
M’Clintock Channel and reached a similar conclusion. He 
reported (1851:102; see also Barr, 2016) that “huge masses 
of ice” were pressed up into ridges, sometimes resembling 
“a heavy cross sea suddenly frozen solid.” However, Osborn 
did not realize he was looking at a channel through which a 
large part of the Viscount Melville Sound ice was carried to 
the southeast. Instead, he thought it was a bay (later marked 
on some maps as Osborn Bay) and that Prince of Wales 
Island continued westward. 
On his return to Griffith Island, Osborn (1852:222) 
was met with the news that open water had been found up 
Wellington Channel. Since all routes to the south seemed 
impassable, the attention of most explorers in the eastern 
Arctic was concentrated on Wellington Channel for the 
next few years. 
There was, however, one more search in the vicinity 
of North Somerset. In 1851 Lady Franklin sent out an 
expedition commanded by William Kennedy. Because of 
continued unusual ice conditions in Barrow Strait, Kennedy 
was unable to get to Griffith Island and so was not aware of 
what Austin’s men had done. He wintered in Prince Regent 
Inlet; from there he made his way to the southern end of 
Peel Sound on foot, following the narrow strait that divides 
Somerset Island from Boothia. Kennedy named it Bellot 
Strait. 
From the western end of Bellot Strait he crossed Peel 
Sound over the ice, intent on reaching the area west of Cape 
Walker. Looking northward, Kennedy (1853:134) felt sure 
he saw land from one shore to another. He traveled to the 
west coast of Prince of Wales Island, then returned to the 
east coast—that is, to the west side of Peel Sound—well 
to the north of the place where he had first crossed from 
Somerset Island. Kennedy therefore unfortunately did not 
realize his earlier mistake. After his return, the name Peel 
Strait was changed to Peel Sound because of his report that 
the southern end was closed (McClintock, 1857a:195n).
A western ship expedition had set out in 1850. It 
consisted of two vessels, Enterprise, captained by Richard 
Collinson, and Investigator, captained by Robert McClure. 
The orders left the two leaders free to decide their own 
course once in the north. The ships separated during the 
outward voyage, and McClure—seemingly eager to operate 
independently of Collinson, his senior officer—rushed 
into the Arctic alone. He quickly discovered the southern 
part of Banks Island, then followed its eastern coast into 
Prince of Wales Strait. He wintered in the ice near the 
strait’s northern end, and after a short sledge journey was 
able to confirm on 26 October 1850 that it opened into 
Viscount Melville Sound. Although Melville Island was not 
visible, the explorers’ sight reportedly (Osborn, 1856:138) 
“embraced a distance which precluded the possibility of 
any land lying” between them and it. In 1851 McClure 
sailed farther north, but still could not reach the sound by 
ship. In an extraordinarily bold move, he then turned south 
and went around the island to M’Clure Strait at its northern 
end, experiencing unprecedented danger from the heavy 
Beaufort Sea ice. Because the water was deep just off the 
northwestern coast, the ice was pressed very close to the 
land, leaving barely enough room for the Investigator to 
slip by. McClure was happy to take up winter quarters in 
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the safety of a bay, to which he gave the apt name Bay of 
Mercy. From there, McClure sledged to Winter Harbour, 
Parry’s old winter quarters on Melville Island, establishing 
beyond doubt that his discoveries and Parry’s were 
connected by water.
McClure had found not one but two Northwest 
Passages—one of them the passage sought by Franklin. 
And unlike Franklin and Crozier, he knew the distance 
separating him from previously navigated waters was short. 
McClure desperately hoped to take his ship eastward and 
back to England, but the Investigator remained frozen in 
from the autumn of 1851 until the spring of 1853, when it 
was abandoned. McClure had left a message at Winter 
Harbour, which was found by a party from a new eastern 
expedition led by Sir Edward Belcher. Belcher’s main 
purpose was to explore Wellington Channel, but Henry 
Kellett had been sent westward to look for Collinson and 
McClure with two ships, Resolute and Intrepid. McClure 
wanted to remain in the Investigator but Kellett, appalled 
by the crew’s poor condition, would not permit it. 
When the news reached England, Parry (in Anon., 1853) 
marveled that McClure had stood on “the very land I saw 
in coming from the eastward, but could not reach; so that 
there we are met within 60 miles.” Nothing new would 
have been proved by taking the Investigator through waters 
already sailed by Parry. Nevertheless, the requirement 
for a discoverer to navigate the entire passage was firmly 
engrained in the minds of naval officers. McClure therefore 
fell back on the weak argument that he had traveled from 
Pacific to Atlantic, partly in different ships and partly on 
foot over a frozen channel. This claim won him a monetary 
award and his knighthood, but few Arctic experts were 
convinced. As a result, there has never been enough 
emphasis on the fact that McClure brought his ship very 
close to the farthest point reached by Parry’s vessels, and 
that the intervening waters were quite certainly navigable 
when free (or partly free) of ice. The route west of Banks 
Island was clearly far too dangerous for any further 
attempts there, but Prince of Wales Strait was a different 
matter. In 1850 and 1851, Austin and Kennedy were unable 
to pass through an area that Parry had navigated with 
relative ease, so McClure’s failure to get through in those 
years should not have been taken as proof that the strait’s 
northern end was always blocked. 
Collinson wintered in Hong Kong in 1850 – 51, then 
headed north and followed McClure’s route up Prince of 
Wales Strait just after McClure himself had left it. The 
Enterprise reached the northern end of the strait, but could 
not pass through into Viscount Melville Sound. Collinson 
wintered on the west coast of Victoria Island and sent a 
sledge party to Melville Island. This journey confirmed 
beyond all doubt that Prince of Wales Strait was connected 
to the waters reached by Parry. 
In 1852 Collinson sailed the Enterprise to Cambridge 
Bay on the southeast coast of Victoria Island, proving that 
much of Dease and Simpson’s route was navigable. The 
next spring, he sledged along the island’s east coast and 
came close to the scene of the Franklin tragedy, for he 
was on the west side of Victoria Strait. Collinson reached 
Gateshead Island (see McKenzie, 1975) at the junction of 
Victoria Strait and M’Clintock Channel. As he realized 
after finding a cairn and note near the farthest point of his 
journey, he had been preceded in the summer of 1851 by 
Rae, who had covered the same area by boat. It was Rae 
who bestowed the name Victoria Strait.
Both Rae and Collinson deduced that there was a 
water connection to Barrow Strait north of them. Rae 
(1852:93) noted that the flood tide came from the north, 
while Collinson (in United Kingdom, House of Commons, 
1855:32) observed that the ice was “pressed upon the 
shore from a northern direction.” Collinson, who traveled 
in the spring, recorded fairly heavy ice in Victoria Strait, 
while Rae, traveling in the summer, did not. Both, 
however, observed unusually heavy floes at the junction 
with M’Clintock Channel (Rae, 1852:85 – 90; Collinson, 
1889:288). Collinson (1854) thought there was likely a strait 
from this point to Cape Walker, and he hoped that Franklin 
had not entered it only to become trapped in the ice.
Neither Rae nor Collinson considered Victoria Strait 
unnavigable. Indeed, Collinson (in United Kingdom, 
House of Commons, 1855:31 – 32) was convinced there was 
no navigable passage through Viscount Melville Sound 
and therefore Victoria Strait and the waters west of Cape 
Bunny were the last links. He of course knew nothing about 
the reports by Browne and Kennedy, which might have 
modified his views. When the ice broke out of Cambridge 
Bay in the summer of 1853, Collinson initially intended to 
continue to the northeast. As he later recounted (1855:203), 
“our egress by Peel Inlet appeared to me quite as feasible 
as the western route.” But after examining the ship’s stores, 
he realized that the full allowance of coal for heating and 
cooking had not been loaded at the dockyard. 
Collinson decided to return westward, where driftwood 
was abundant. One of his officers later claimed that this 
was merely an excuse, and that the captain was “running 
away” from danger (Barr, 2007:181). However, Collinson 
knew the discoveries he had already made would count for 
nothing because McClure and Rae had preceded him. He 
therefore had every motivation to attempt the Northwest 
Passage through Victoria Strait and Peel Sound. Given the 
possibility that he might be forced to spend yet another 
winter in the Arctic, Collinson’s retreat was a rare example 
of caution even when daring might have made him famous. 
Both Rae and Collinson picked up debris that 
evidently came from a Royal Navy ship, since it bore the 
government’s “broad arrow” mark. However, neither 
man immediately associated these items with Franklin, 
reasoning instead that they might have drifted south from 
the search vessels in Barrow Strait. Collinson accordingly 
did not have the prospect of determining Franklin’s fate to 
tempt him toward King William Island. 
After his 1851 search, Rae returned to the task of 
surveying the remaining unknown continental coastline. 
To that end, in 1854 he traveled overland from Repulse Bay 
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to the farthest point reached by Dease and Simpson (the 
Castor and Pollux River), intending to continue north to 
Bellot Strait. On the outward journey, he met an Inuk who 
told him that some white men had died far to the west. The 
man said he had never been in this place himself and could 
not guide Rae there. Rae then traveled along the east side of 
Rae Strait and realized that King William “Land” was an 
island. 
Because of poor weather conditions, Rae doubted he 
could reach Bellot Strait, and he turned back. At Pelly 
Bay he again met Inuit. This time he obtained detailed 
information about the dead white men, and concluded 
that the place where they died must be Chantrey Inlet. He 
received the impression (1855b:250 – 251) that the men had 
been seen alive on King William Island in the spring of 
1850, having abandoned their ships in the ice. Their corpses 
had reportedly been found in the summer of that year on the 
Adelaide Peninsula and Montreal Island. 
Rae Strait was part of the route followed when Roald 
Amundsen navigated from Atlantic to Pacific in 1903 – 06. 
However, Rae’s reports to the HBC and the RGS (1855a, 
b) said nothing whatever about the possibility of having 
found a link in the Northwest Passage. To the HBC, Rae 
emphasized his chagrin over the failure of his coastal 
survey, without any suggestion that the discovery of Rae 
Strait compensated for this disappointment. There was, 
indeed, no reason for him to consider Rae Strait in relation 
to the Northwest Passage problem. Peel Sound, which 
would also be part of Amundsen’s route, had been declared 
a dead end by Kennedy. Even if Rae doubted Kennedy’s 
report, on the evidence of his own eyes in 1851 he was more 
likely to have believed that the wider, and presumably much 
deeper, Victoria Strait was the logical next step for any 
navigator who managed to pass through Peel Sound. That 
he did so consider it was shown the next year.
THE DEBATES OF 1855
Belcher, Kellett, McClure, and Rae all returned to 
England in the autumn of 1854; Collinson too was back 
in 1855. McClure assiduously lobbied politicians for a 
monetary reward (Stein, 2015:237 – 238), but at the same 
time Rae’s news inspired Lady Franklin, Richardson, and 
others, including Sir Roderick Murchison, the influential 
president of the RGS, to mount a rival claim on behalf of 
Franklin and his men. Peel Sound, some members of this 
group reasoned, must be a strait after all and navigable in 
some years. They all agreed that if the men of the Erebus 
and Terror died in Chantrey Inlet, then they had reached the 
area discovered by Back, Dease, and Simpson. Collinson 
had brought his ship almost to this point, and after his 
return he championed the idea that there was a navigable 
passage through Victoria Strait. McClure had confirmed the 
existence of his first passage in October 1850; if Franklin’s 
men had reached the continent in the spring or summer of 
that year, they had priority. 
In June 1855, the appointment of a parliamentary select 
committee to investigate McClure’s claim was ordered. 
The committee’s hearings were held in July. Before the 
first hearing, Franklin’s supporters opened their campaign 
with a letter to the Times from Richardson (1855a). 
Richardson asserted that Franklin was the first discoverer 
of a Northwest Passage and McClure the second. That 
Franklin’s ships had been abandoned “in a waterway 
continuous with the sea that washes the continent” was, he 
wrote, proved by the relics Collinson found near Cambridge 
Bay. Therefore, according to Richardson, Collinson might 
be considered a third discoverer. Richardson knew that 
Rae had retrieved other items two years before Collinson, 
and since he and Rae were on good terms, it is difficult to 
see why he gave the accolade to Collinson. Possibly the 
fact that Collinson had arrived in Cambridge Bay by ship 
influenced Richardson’s thinking.
Rae penned an immediate response (1855c). He made 
no argument against Richardson’s claims about Franklin 
and McClure, but wrote that there was “one portion” 
of Richardson’s letter with which he could not agree. 
Collinson, Rae insisted, had “nothing but theory to guide 
him in supposing that a channel leading northward to 
Barrow’s Strait existed,” because he brought back no 
definitive tidal observations. Rae did not think mere 
deduction could entitle anyone “to stand number three on 
this list as discoverer of a north-west passage,” but if such a 
criterion were accepted, then
I should certainly have priority to Captain Collinson, 
as I in the summer of 1851 ... had an opportunity 
of watching ... the direction of the tides; the flood 
invariably came from the northward, and the ebb 
returned in that direction (as shown in my chart of 
1851) thus proving clearly that there was a water 
communication between Victoria Strait and Peel Sound 
to the northward.
Evidently, Rae accepted the theory that Victoria Strait was 
part of a navigable Northwest Passage. 
Rae did not ask for the opportunity to speak at the select 
committee’s hearings. However, both Murchison and the 
newly appointed hydrographer of the Royal Navy, Captain 
John Washington, gave testimony on Franklin’s behalf. To 
reinforce the points they made, Lady Franklin addressed 
a letter to the committee (in United Kingdom, House 
of Commons, 1855:xviii), in which she argued that Peel 
Sound and Victoria Strait were parts of “a more navigable 
passage” than the ones found by McClure. 
The first witnesses were Back and Kellett, who both 
supported McClure. Back declared that if the Investigator 
had been equipped with a steam engine, McClure would 
probably have got through, and he insisted that McClure had 
not only found but “made” the passage, ignoring all cavils 
about the fact that the Investigator had been abandoned. 
Kellett stated that McClure had priority of discovery over 
Collinson, but did not address Franklin’s possible claim. 
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He agreed with a committee member’s suggestion that, 
“geographically speaking,” McClure had “performed” the 
passage, but denied that steam power would have brought 
the Investigator through (in United Kingdom, House of 
Commons, 1855:5). 
On the second day, James Ross argued that Parry, 
Franklin, Richardson, and McClure were joint discoverers 
of McClure’s passages, and slyly pointed out that McClure 
was not the first to journey from ocean to ocean through 
the Arctic, since a small party of the Investigator’s men, 
led by Samuel Gurney Cresswell, had preceded the others 
and arrived in England in 1853. Captain Washington then 
spoke in favour of Franklin, describing Victoria Strait as 
the final “link” and “the only portion required to solve the 
problem.” However, Washington had to admit that McClure 
had traveled right through the archipelago, while Franklin 
had not (in United Kingdom, House of Commons, 1855:11). 
Next came McClure’s own testimony. He declared that 
he would have made the passage with the aid of steam; that 
even without it the Investigator could have got through in 
1854; and that if he had received no aid from Kellett, he 
would still have made his escape without losing more than a 
few men (in United Kingdom, House of Commons, 1855:16-
18). However, these claims were firmly contradicted by Dr. 
William Domville of the Resolute and by Rear Admiral 
W.A.B. Hamilton, the secretary of the Admiralty. Hamilton 
put it tactfully, and yet with the utmost clarity, when he 
suggested (in United Kingdom, House of Commons, 
1855:25) that McClure’s very courage and determination 
had led him to take “a more sanguine view…than the facts 
and circumstances warranted.” 
Murchison testified on the final day. He began by stating 
(in United Kingdom, House of Commons, 1855:18 – 19) 
that McClure was entitled to a reward for being the first to 
have “gone through…in attempting to make that passage.” 
Nevertheless, in his view, “that those men whose relics 
were found near the mouth of the Back River have effected 
what must be called a North-west Passage, cannot be 
doubted.” Murchison admitted that Franklin’s men had not 
reached Chantrey Inlet in a ship; but, he argued, how did 
that make their case different from McClure’s? Murchison 
also read from Beaufort’s strongly worded memo (in United 
Kingdom, House of Commons, 1855:20): “Let due honours 
and rewards be showered on the heads of those who have 
nobly toiled in deciphering the puzzling Arctic labyrinth…
but let the name of discoverer of the North-west Passage 
be for ever linked to that of Sir John Franklin.” Murchison 
suggested that McClure should not be commended for 
having discovered “the” Northwest Passage—a move 
that was all the more logical because McClure himself 
had found two passages. The last word went to Collinson, 
who affirmed (in United Kingdom, House of Commons, 
1855:31 – 32) that Victoria Strait was “the only way in which 
the passage can be made.”
The committee’s report duly and cautiously stated that 
McClure and his men were “undoubtedly the first who have 
passed by water from sea to sea, and have returned to this 
country a living evidence of the existence of a North-west 
Passage” and that they had completed “the last link in the 
chain of discovery.” Whether Franklin had a superior claim 
was described as a matter on which the committee could 
not judge (United Kingdom, House of Commons, 1855:iii, 
vi, viii-ix). 
A few months later, Richardson (1856) wrote a 
short biography of Franklin for the new edition of the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica. He borrowed the term used in 
the committee’s report when he declared that Franklin and 
his men had forged the “last link” with their lives. Lady 
Franklin had her heart set on a monument naming Sir John 
as the passage’s discoverer, since a mere committee report 
would “be as air, when set against such an imperishable 
record” (Cracroft, 1855b). Then there was the hope of 
finding Franklin’s journals. An expedition down the 
Back River led by James Anderson of the HBC found 
traces of the lost explorers but no documents. When this 
unsatisfactory result was announced in January 1856, Lady 
Franklin and many others refused to accept it as final.
McCLINTOCK, THE PEEL SOUND THEORY,
AND FRANKLIN AS THE TRUE DISCOVERER
The conclusion that Franklin had passed through Peel 
Sound was not universally accepted. The geographer John 
Brown had deduced that there must be a strait between 
Victoria Island and Prince of Wales Island. Immediately 
after Collinson’s return, Brown suggested this theory to 
him, and Collinson agreed that it was quite plausible (see 
Pim, 1856:213). Collinson (1855:202) then referred to the 
possibility of a new strait in his report to the RGS. The idea 
was also taken up by geographer Alexander Findlay (1856) 
and naval officer Alexander Becher (1856). 
The young Arctic officers George Richards (1856) and 
Bedford Pim (1856) were not entirely convinced by Brown, 
who maintained (in Pim, 1856:212) that Kennedy’s report 
about Peel Sound was probably correct. Instead, Richards 
favoured an attempt by Peel Sound, with sledge journeys 
to investigate the possible new strait. Pim thought two ships 
should be sent out, one by Collinson’s route and one by Peel 
Sound, while another party descended the Back River in boats. 
McClintock, who after serving under James Ross in 
1848 – 49 had made extensive sledge journeys during 
Austin’s and Belcher’s expeditions, was also thinking about 
a new search, and Lady Franklin favoured him as leader 
(Cracroft, 1855a). Because the government declined to act, 
and McClintock therefore led a small private expedition, 
there was no possibility of sending out more than one ship. 
But in any case, McClintock appeared interested only in 
Peel Sound. During a lecture (1857a:195), he explained that 
in 1849, “we travelled down along the leeward side of the 
strait, where all the ice-pressure was most apparent,” but in 
1851 Browne, on the windward side, had observed smooth 
ice near shore, “so as to show that water must have existed 
the previous autumn.” 
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McClintock’s published plan (1857b) stated that he would 
attempt to pass through Peel Sound and if unsuccessful 
would try Bellot Strait. His aim was to reach Victoria Island 
and winter there, then sledge to King William Island. From 
his Victoria Island base, he could easily return home via the 
Bering Strait. In other words, McClintock hoped not only 
to determine Franklin’s fate but to navigate the Northwest 
Passage. His plan did not specify which route he would 
take between Peel Sound and Victoria Island, but after the 
expedition he claimed (1859b:313, 315 – 316) that he had 
never intended to try Victoria Strait. Instead, he recounted 
that Rae’s 1854 discovery had inspired him to consider a 
route east of the island. 
In 1858, McClintock’s Fox advanced only 25 miles 
into Peel Sound before being blocked by ice. After several 
attempts in Bellot Strait, he finally reached its western end, 
only to find the exit sealed off by the Peel Sound pack. To 
the north, McClintock (1859b:196) saw ice “of more than 
one winter’s growth, apparently immovable in consequence 
of the numerous islets and rocks which rise through and 
hold it fast.” To the south the ice was “much more broken 
up.” McClintock patiently waited until late September, 
when only four miles of ice separated him from open water 
to the south. As if to acknowledge the different conditions 
north and south of his position, he gave the southern 
passage its own name, Franklin Channel, later changed to 
Franklin Strait (McClintock, 1869:168). 
McClintock turned back and wintered at the eastern end 
of Bellot Strait. In the autumn of 1858 his plan (1859b:200) 
was to sledge to the mouth of the Back River, examining 
one side of King William Island on his outward journey 
and the other on his return journey. Allen Young would 
chart the unknown shores of Peel Sound and Franklin 
Strait while William Hobson completed the survey of the 
continental coast by traveling south along Boothia. Then 
there was the matter of Brown’s supposed new strait—
although McClintock curiously did not mention Brown 
as the originator of this theory. Once their first tasks were 
completed, Young was to follow the southwestern shore 
of Prince of Wales Island and Hobson the northeastern 
shore of Victoria Island, to determine whether such a strait 
existed. 
On a preliminary trip to Boothia early in 1859, 
McClintock himself completed the continental survey. From 
the Inuit, he learned (1859b:234, 251) that Franklin’s ships 
had been abandoned off the west coast of King William 
Island. McClintock then altered the plan (1859b:255), 
assigning Hobson the task of searching this coast from 
north to south, while he himself would examine the straits 
between Boothia and King William Island, proceed to the 
Chantrey Inlet area, then return up the west coast of King 
William Island, so that it would be searched twice. In his 
narrative McClintock declared (1859b:313 – 314) that his 
observations on this journey reinforced his pre-existing 
belief in a navigable channel east of the island, but it seems 
possible that his original hypothesis was weaker than he 
admitted, and that the theory took on new importance 
when the Inuit told him the eastern straits were open every 
summer. By the time McClintock received Hobson’s and 
Young’s reports, his bias in favour of the eastern route was 
strong. 
From the northwest coast of King William Island, 
Hobson observed that the ice was “very rough, and crushed 
up into large masses” (quoted in McClintock, 1859b:341). 
McClintock himself wrote in the first edition of his 
narrative (1859b:314, 341) that Victoria Strait was “full of” 
and “choke[d] up” with such ice; in a later edition (1869:299) 
he modified his statement somewhat, writing merely 
that “a large proportion” of the ice in the strait was of an 
exceptionally rough nature. However, in a part of Hobson’s 
report not quoted by McClintock, the former observed (in 
Stenton, 2014:519) that although the ice pressure along the 
coast was often severe, the “general character” of the ice 
itself was “not particularly heavy; I can only remember 
one place where there was ice which bore the appearance 
of age.” McClintock had previously insisted his own 
observations made on the leeward side of Peel Sound in 
1849 were less valid than those made by Browne on the 
windward side. Yet he declared (1859b:314) that Victoria 
Strait was unnavigable based on selective reporting from 
the leeward side, even though Rae and Collinson had drawn 
no such conclusion from the windward side. 
Young traveled along the coast of Prince of Wales 
Island as far as, and a little beyond, the point reached by 
Osborn from the other direction in 1851, thus confirming 
the existence of Brown’s new channel. According to 
McClintock (1859b:338), Young was convinced the channel 
was “quite unnavigable” because of the “continuous ice-
stream” pushed through it by the winds and current. The 
clear implication was that Franklin could not have taken 
that route. 
According to McClintock’s reconstruction (1859b:341), 
in 1846 Peel Sound and Franklin Strait were not just barely 
navigable but quite open. Then, “leaving clear water behind 
him,” Franklin “pressed his ships into the pack when he 
attempted to force through Victoria Strait.” The result was a 
combination of triumph and tragedy, made even more tragic 
in retrospect by the knowledge of how “very different the 
result might and probably would have been” if only Franklin 
had “known of the existence of a ship-channel, sheltered by 
King William Island.” This sheltered channel, McClintock 
declared, was the final link of the only navigable Northwest 
Passage. But the way to it was through Peel Sound, which 
McClintock himself had failed to navigate. Not until years 
later (1875) did McClintock plainly admit that at most 
Peel Sound was open only once every four or five years. 
Whether such a route could really be considered navigable 
was a question he preferred to avoid.
Moreover, Young’s report (1859) was less categorical 
than McClintock’s summary of it. Young wrote that it did 
not seem impossible for a ship to drift through M’Clintock 
Channel with the ice, and his comments show a clear 
reluctance to generalize from the observations of one 
journey. Sixteen years later, after leading an expedition 
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of his own to the area (see below), Young publicly stated 
(1875a) that whether Franklin went by Peel Sound or 
M’Clintock Channel was “not known” (see also Young, 
1875b). 
Hobson retrieved the famous Franklin record at Victory 
Point, King William Island. It consisted of two messages. 
The first was written by Graham Gore at the outset of a 
sledge journey in May 1847. The key fact it revealed was 
that Erebus and Terror spent the expedition’s second winter 
in the ice in latitude 70˚05′ N, longitude 98˚23′ W—that is, 
just north of King William Island. The second message, 
written by James Fitzjames in April 1848, added that the 
ships had been beset since 12 September 1846, that Franklin 
had died on 11 June 1847, and that the vessels had been 
abandoned five leagues (approx. 28 km) north-northwest of 
Victory Point. The survivors planned to start for the Back 
River the next day. McClintock (1859b:274 – 278) found a 
skeleton a few miles beyond Cape Herschel, proving that 
during the retreat Franklin’s men passed the Dease and 
Simpson cairn. 
The first part of the Victory Point record offered the 
tantalizing possibility that Cape Herschel had been reached 
during the May 1847 sledge trip, and that Gore had returned 
and reported the good news before Franklin’s death. 
McClintock subscribed, though only tentatively, to this 
version of events (1859b:286, 1869:257, 267). However, he 
was quite uncompromising in his statements (1859b:316, 
1869:267) that Franklin had discovered the Northwest 
Passage, even if it was not the navigable passage. 
There were some protests against McClintock’s theories. 
When he told his story at a meeting of the RGS, Belcher (in 
McClintock, 1859a:8 – 9) opined that Franklin had reached 
King William Island by way of M’Clintock Channel, and 
that if he had followed the western shore of Victoria Strait 
he might have got through. Privately, Richardson (1859) 
agreed about Franklin’s route, but he mildly observed that 
“as no one can be so well qualified as [McClintock] is to 
form a correct judgement on this point I readily defer to his 
opinion.” Others may well have shared this reluctance to 
challenge McClintock. 
Only Brown publicly dissented at any length. He 
observed that M’Clintock Channel was both wide and, as 
the heavy ice floating in it indicated, deep. “Through such a 
channel,” Brown wrote (1860:31), “there must be…at times, 
a passage practicable for ships.” The amount of pack would 
naturally vary from year to year, perhaps giving Franklin 
an opportunity. Nevertheless, Brown conceded that 
Franklin had more likely been beset in Viscount Melville 
Sound and carried unwillingly down M’Clintock Channel. 
That both M’Clintock Channel and Peel Sound 
contained heavy ice in 1846 seems highly likely, given that 
neither of them was ever observed in anything approaching 
a navigable condition during the search period. In Peel 
Sound, Franklin’s ships would have been immobilized 
by ice such as the search parties reported. But in the far 
wider M’Clintock Channel, the current and the prevailing 
northwest winds could have carried the trapped ships to 
King William Island. It generally was—and still is—
assumed that Erebus and Terror were beset in the same spot 
where they wintered in 1846 – 47, but Brown (1860:32 – 33) 
correctly pointed out that this was not stated in the Victory 
Point record. The location of the wintering was given by 
Gore in 1847 and the date of besetment by Fitzjames in 
1848, and there was accordingly no clear implication that 
the ships had been trapped north of King William Island 
on 12 September 1846. Moreover, if Franklin deviated 
significantly from his original plan by turning southward 
to the east, rather than to the west, of Cape Walker, it is 
strange that neither officer mentioned this fact. Brown 
showed excessive dogmatism by insisting that Franklin 
undoubtedly took M’Clintock Channel; nevertheless, his 
arguments have merit, and it seems reasonable to consider 
the question of Franklin’s route as unresolved—and 
perhaps unresolvable (see also Hickey et al., 1993). 
Although Brown’s reconstruction was plausible, 
it won no favour with his countrymen. According to 
Brown, Franklin had been caught helplessly in the ice and 
current, then carried to the southeast, where he had no 
wish to go. McClintock, in contrast, portrayed Franklin 
as carrying out his plans with initial luck as he passed 
triumphantly through Peel Sound. Then, faced with the 
barrier of ice in Victoria Strait, Franklin had supposedly 
refused to abandon his chosen path. McClintock’s version 
was supported by Charles Weld, the secretary of the 
Royal Society, who was Franklin’s nephew by marriage. 
According to Weld (1860:226), in 1845 Franklin had taken 
a map and “pointed…to the western entrance of Simpson 
Strait,” saying, “If I can but get down there, my work is 
done; for from thence it would be all plain sailing to the 
westward.” Weld never mentioned this alleged comment 
until early 1860, and it is incompatible with what Franklin 
himself wrote in 1845. However, the anecdote reinforced 
McClintock’s telling of Franklin’s story as one of success 
followed by tragedy. It was accordingly repeated by 
McClintock’s friend Osborn (1860:45) and many other 
writers. 
Reviewers of McClintock’s book readily accepted his 
claim that because Franklin’s expedition had been the first 
to prove there was a water connection, Sir John was the true 
discoverer (e.g., Anon., 1860a:151; Lushington, 1860:275). 
A few letters were written to the press on McClure’s behalf, 
but McClure himself, though bitterly resentful, remained 
silent. In 1860 the RGS awarded its gold medal to Lady 
Franklin, in recognition of the fact that her husband had “in 
a geographical sense, firmly established the existence of a 
North-West Passage” (Anon., 1860b:xcv). In 1866 a statue 
funded by a government grant commemorated Franklin 
as the discoverer, depicting him at the moment when he 
announced to his crew that the passage’s existence was 
confirmed (Anon., 1866). 
McClure (1860) believed that his opponents could 
“never do away with” his feat of crossing the archipelago. 
He was not wrong, for after his death the Times (Anon., 
1873) praised him for both “discovering and completing” 
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the passage. This tribute drew an immediate response 
from Lady Franklin (1873), who extolled McClure’s feats 
of navigation but insisted on her husband’s priority as 
the discoverer, citing the RGS award as proof that high 
authorities had acknowledged Sir John’s claim. McClure’s 
cause was taken up with passion by Alexander Armstrong, 
who had served as the Investigator’s doctor. 
Armstrong (1873a) accused Murchison and others of 
having indulged “the weakness or the ambition” of Lady 
Franklin, to McClure’s detriment. He argued (1873b) that 
only if survivors from Erebus and Terror had been rescued 
and brought home by Collinson could Franklin be said to 
have discovered a passage. McClintock (1873) ended the 
dispute by observing that he had seen both M’Clure Strait 
and Victoria Strait and was convinced that neither would 
ever be navigated. Instead, “the only way to accomplish the 
transit by ship” lay east of King William Island. 
Two years later Lady Franklin died, having secured 
for her husband a memorial in Westminster Abbey 
that described him as the discoverer. Yet the issues of 
navigability and actual navigation, so pointedly raised by 
McClintock in 1873, remained to haunt advocates of both 
Franklin and McClure. George Richards concluded that 
neither man was the discoverer. “In awarding the palm,” 
he wrote (in Collinson, 1889:x – xi), “a compromise was 
offered which history will not ratify; but will probably 
pronounce the verdict that the Passage has not been 
accomplished at all.”
THE QUESTION OF NAVIGABILITY
At the end of the Franklin search, four Northwest 
Passages had been geographically discovered—that is, 
two or more explorers had traveled from one end of each 
passage to the other by various combinations of ship, boat, 
and foot travel. 
1. Lancaster Sound, Barrow Strait, Peel Sound (or Lancaster 
Sound, Prince Regent Inlet, Bellot Strait, Peel Sound), 
Franklin Strait, Victoria Strait, and the western Arctic 
coastal waters. 
2. Lancaster Sound, Barrow Strait, Viscount Melville 
Sound, and Prince of Wales Strait. 
3. Lancaster Sound, Barrow Strait, Viscount Melville 
Sound, and M’Clure Strait.
4. Lancaster Sound, Barrow Strait, Peel Sound (or Lancaster 
Sound, Prince Regent Inlet, Bellot Strait, Peel Sound), 
Franklin Strait, James Ross Strait, Rae Strait, Simpson 
Strait, and the western Arctic coastal waters. 
Note that Davis Strait and Baffin Bay on the east and the 
Bering Strait, Chukchi Sea, and Beaufort Sea on the west 
are common to all the above routes. Bellot Strait is here 
considered as a variation on the Peel Sound routes because 
whether ships could pass through its western end depended 
on ice conditions in Peel Sound. Franklin might have 
reached Victoria Strait by Viscount Melville Sound and 
M’Clintock Channel, while Hudson Strait, Fury and Hecla 
Strait, the Gulf of Boothia and Prince Regent Inlet provided 
a possible alternative to Baffin Bay and Lancaster Sound. 
Though these water connections were known, neither route 
was generally considered as part of a Northwest Passage.
None of the passages had been navigated from end to end. 
Therefore, in the terminology used in 1818, they had been 
found out but not sailed through, and hence not discovered 
as navigable passages. Yet because there was no more 
geographical finding out to do along the four routes, anyone 
sailing from ocean to ocean would not meet both original 
criteria. It was a strange and paradoxical situation. Several 
passages had been mapped, yet no explorer could make an 
unchallengeable claim to have discovered a passage. Nor, 
even though navigation was the missing element, could 
anyone establish a true discovery claim by navigating. 
Whether the passages were navigable was a matter for 
speculation. By two different routes, McClure had brought 
the Investigator very close to waters sailed by Parry’s Hecla 
and Griper. Collinson’s Enterprise had almost reached 
the spot where Erebus and Terror were abandoned. Only 
in the fourth passage was there a major gap of navigation, 
since at least the distance from the bottom of Franklin 
Strait to Cambridge Bay, and possibly more, remained 
unsailed by ships. Nevertheless, most historians have 
followed McClintock, assuming that this fourth passage 
was the most navigable, and indeed that it was probably the 
only navigable passage for sailing ships. The fact that in 
1903 – 06 Amundsen found Peel Sound open and took his 
vessel, the sloop Gjøa, east of King William Island and then 
to the Bering Strait naturally reinforces this view. 
However, sloops have only one mast and are classified 
as sailboats, not ships. The 57-ton (Kjær, 2005:355) Gjøa 
was tiny compared to the ships used in 19th-century 
British exploration, which were themselves not large by 
naval standards. Horatio Nelson’s Victory was more than 
3000 tons, and the last wooden battleships, launched in 
the 1850s, were close to 7000 tons (Parkes, 1957:7). Hecla, 
Griper, Erebus, and Terror were 375, 180, 372, and 326 
tons, respectively (Parry, 1821:i; Pearsall, 1973:782), while 
Investigator was 480 tons and Enterprise, 530 tons (Stein, 
2015:18). Franklin might have sent boat or sledge parties 
to James Ross Strait and Rae Strait in 1846 – 47, but as 
Woodman (1991:75) has pointed out, he would surely have 
considered this route unnavigable for his ships (see also 
Potter, 2012). Accordingly, the Gjøa’s exploits in such 
shallow coastal waters did not fulfil the requirements set 
out in 1818. 
Climate is another important factor bearing on 
the question of navigability. Scientists from the Polar 
Continental Shelf Project, which began in the late 1950s, 
were able to outline the f luctuations in the Canadian 
Arctic’s climate over the preceding 700 years through 
melt layers and pollen concentrations in ice cores from 
the Devon Ice Cap. Their data showed that the decades 
between 1810 and 1860 were among the coldest periods in 
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that entire time span. Conditions were at their very worst 
in the 1840s and 1850s. Immediately after the Franklin 
search, temperatures began to rise, and by the 1960s they 
were well above the 700-year average (Alt et al., 1985: 
fig. 12). The impact of ice conditions on navigation was 
therefore anything but a constant factor. Clearly, passages 
that were not navigable during the main period of British 
Arctic exploration must have been so, to varying degrees, 
at other times. Between 1859 and 1950, most summers had 
temperatures slightly above the 700-year average. Reports 
from expeditions in this period are accordingly a better 
source regarding navigability than those written between 
1818 and 1859.
VOYAGES AFTER 1859
On the route advocated by McClintock, the first attempt 
was made by his former subordinate Young in Pandora. In 
1875 Young sailed down Peel Sound to a point just north 
of Bellot Strait, where from a hill he saw (1879:56) “one 
unbroken pack extending from shore to shore, and as far as 
the visible horizon to the southward.” Convinced that Peel 
Sound was rarely open, Young feared to winter in the strait 
because he might not get out the next year.
Young was followed by Amundsen in 1903. In what 
the Inuit later told him was an exceptionally open season, 
Amundsen (1908I:55, 58 – 59, 215) was amazed to 
encounter almost no ice in Peel Sound. Navigation through 
James Ross Strait proved difficult, and the Gjøa twice 
went aground there (1908I:62 – 70). Simpson Strait also 
posed a serious challenge, and Amundsen (1908II:119) 
described the eastern part of Queen Maud Gulf as “a most 
disconcerting chaos” of rocks and reefs, where “we bungled 
through zigzag, as if we were drunk.” 
In his journal (2017:517), Amundsen wrote that he had 
completed the “missing link” when he reached Cambridge 
Bay, but in his narrative (1908II:123 – 126) he nevertheless 
depicted himself as wracked with anxiety about whether 
the passage would be accomplished until the moment 
he sighted a whaling ship off Banks Island. Amundsen 
mistakenly believed that McClure and Rae had jointly been 
given the monetary award for discovering the passage, and 
in his autobiography (1927:61), he explained that while 
both these men deserved rewards “for their hardships and 
achievements,” his own voyage was “the first and only 
actual navigation” of the entire passage. Although he had 
formerly (1908I:48 – 49) named Franklin and his men as the 
first discoverers, it seems that he actually considered this 
title his own.
Amundsen (1908II:106) rated Collinson’s contribution 
higher than McClure’s because McClure’s routes were 
never navigable. However, the observations of another 
explorer contradicted the assertion about McClure. In 1906, 
Joseph-Elzéar Bernier (1909:19) found the ice at the eastern 
end of M’Clure Strait “not much heavier” than elsewhere, 
with “openings all along the land of Melville Island as far 
west as we could see.” In 1908, from the same position, 
he saw no ice at all. Wintering on Melville Island, Bernier 
(1910:38, 80 – 81, 85) observed some open water in the strait 
as late as October. One of his officers, Octave Morin, made 
a sledge journey to Prince of Wales Strait, where he found 
smooth new ice, indicating open water the year before 
(Bernier, 1910:133). Ignoring the dangers on the west coast 
of Banks Island, Bernier wanted to try the passage by this 
route, but when he again sailed to M’Clure Strait, he found 
dramatically different conditions. Second officer Robert 
Janes, who was in the crow’s nest, commented: “I never 
saw such ice; it must have been 50 to 60 feet thick” (quoted 
in Bernier, 1911:29). 
In 1915, Vilhjalmur Stefansson tried to take his schooner 
Polar Bear through Prince of Wales Strait, but he was 
stopped by ice and wintered on Victoria Island. However, 
sledge parties reported only young ice in Viscount 
Melville Sound, and over the next few years Stefansson’s 
observations convinced him (1921:430 – 431) that the sound 
was navigable “at least two years out of three” and that 
the passage could likely be made through Prince of Wales 
Strait “quite as easily” as by Amundsen’s route. In 1916 
Stefansson proceeded north by sledge and ordered Polar 
Bear’s captain, Henry Gonzales, to take the ship to Melville 
Island. Gonzales did not, later claiming that the ice had 
been too heavy, but another expedition member reported 
that Prince of Wales Strait had in fact been ice-free and 
that Gonzales was simply afraid to go so far north (Noice, 
n.d.:208, 242).
In 1940, when Henry Larsen was instructed to sail 
through the passage from west to east in the 80-ton 
schooner St. Roch, his first plan was to try Prince of Wales 
Strait. Circumstances made this impossible, so he settled 
for Amundsen’s route. Near King William Island navigation 
was difficult, especially in James Ross Strait, and ice 
conditions on the west coast of Boothia were exceptionally 
bad. Larsen was forced to winter at Pasley Bay, Boothia, 
in 1941 – 42. In the summer of 1942 the ice was again 
extremely heavy. With great difficulty, Larsen made his 
way to Bellot Strait. At first the strait seemed like an ice-
free refuge, but disaster nearly struck when the current 
swept floes from Peel Sound in just behind the ship and 
more pack was sighted ahead (Robinson, 1945:54, 59 – 65; 
Larsen, 1954:24 – 25). 
In 1944, sailing from east to west, Larsen met broken but 
closely packed ice in Viscount Melville Sound, which he 
avoided by a detour north of Byam Martin Island. M’Clure 
Strait was filled with the heaviest floes seen on the voyage, 
but Prince of Wales Strait was reached without much 
difficulty. From that point on it was clear sailing (Robinson, 
1945:66 – 73; Larsen, 1954:39 – 45). Larsen not only became 
the first navigator to make a passage in one season: he did 
it in an astonishing 18 days. But, as Larsen (in Robinson, 
1945:73) cautioned, “Our voyage showed that the Northwest 
Passage can be traversed in a single year, but does not prove 
that this could be accomplished every year.” 
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VICTORIA STRAIT AFTER 1859
As Dunbar (1985) pointed out, after 1859 ship 
expeditions avoided Victoria Strait as if it were cursed, so 
it is impossible to know how much conditions there varied 
during the 19th century. Dunbar, a leading expert on Arctic 
ice, was evidently skeptical of the common assumption 
that navigating the strait had been utterly impossible, and 
she noted (1985:120) the influence of McClintock’s report, 
which made it difficult for others to believe “that the ice 
could have been different” in some years. 
Even in the early part of the 20th century, Victoria Strait 
was seldom visited. By the 1960s, it was often navigable 
and occasionally ice-free (Alt et al., 1985: fig. 8). It is now 
the most commonly used passage except for large vessels 
(Headland, 2017:1). 
In 2014 Erebus was found in Wilmot and Crampton Bay 
on the southeastern side of Queen Maud Gulf. Two years 
later, Terror was also found, in Terror Bay on the southwest 
coast of King William Island. Both ships, therefore, 
survived the most constricted part of Victoria Strait, near 
the Royal Geographical Society Islands. The wreck of 
Terror is in remarkably good condition. While the wreck 
of Erebus is less so, the fatal damage was evidently done 
after Victoria Strait was left behind. These finds prove that 
even in the 1840s and 1850s ships could pass through the 
supposedly unnavigable strait without being destroyed. 
It is possible that, as Woodman (1991) speculated, some 
of Franklin’s men returned to the vessels and sailed them 
southward after ice conditions eased. However, even if 
this was the case, the survivors never reached previously 
navigated waters.
CONCLUSION
Ship expeditions between 1859 and 1950 were too 
infrequent to yield conclusive data, and they tell us nothing 
at all about Victoria Strait. However, they certainly suggest 
that under average conditions the passage through Prince of 
Wales Strait was just as reliably navigable as Amundsen’s 
route, and quite possibly more so. Prince of Wales Strait 
was the link sought by Franklin; it is reasonably well 
sheltered from the Beaufort Sea ice; its depth gives it a 
significant advantage over the route east of King William 
Island; and the passage through it and Parry Channel was 
almost completely navigated during a period when Arctic 
climate was at its coldest. Parry and McClure were the joint 
discoverers of this passage. Parry has long been among the 
most renowned polar explorers, but McClure deserves more 
recognition than he has received from historians. 
There is sometimes a tendency for historians to bestow 
the status of true discoverer on explorers they particularly 
admire. For example, Neatby (1958:182) wrote that “for 
daring and sheer achievement Franklin stands alone; and 
succeeding generations have rewarded him in associating 
his name pre-eminently with the Passage”—a view in 
which Neatby entirely concurred. McGoogan (2001:190) 
alleged that Simpson’s death was providential because 
it prevented an unworthy man from finding the passage. 
In his opinion (2001:305), it was only right for Rae—“a 
peerless figure”—to reveal the Arctic’s “ultimate secret.” 
McGoogan (2001, 2005, 2017) put forward a dramatic 
narrative in which the machinations of Lady Franklin and 
her supporters were directed not against McClure, but 
against Rae—even though Rae had never claimed to be the 
discoverer. McGoogan’s books feature such inaccuracies 
as the statements that Victoria Strait was “forever 
impenetrable to sailing ships” (2001:169) and that Larsen’s 
voyage through Prince of Wales Strait was possible only 
because he “relied almost entirely” on St. Roch’s engine 
(2001:258).
McClure’s character, in contrast to Parry’s, Franklin’s, 
and Rae’s, is not admirable from any point of view. He was 
callous, vindictive, and obsessively ambitious; his only 
good traits were courage and superb seamanship. Yet the 
entire process of European discovery, in the Arctic and 
elsewhere, is now generally viewed with cynicism. McClure 
was no hero, but do we really still need supposedly flawless 
heroes? It should surely be possible to point out the virtues 
of the route he discovered without any implication that he 
himself deserves to be admired.
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